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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the literature on hedge funds (HFs) developed over the last two 
decades, particularly that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion piece 
covers the risk management characteristics of HFs). It classifies, the current HF literature, 
suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” and which problems have not been yet 
adequately addressed. It also discusses the effects of past financial regulation and the 
prospects for the effect of new financial regulation on the HF industry and its performance 
and risk management practices, and suggests new avenues for research. Furthermore, it 
highlights the importance of managerial characteristics for HF performance, and the successes 
and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools. 
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1. Introduction 
“Hedge Funds” (HFs) raise capital via private placements and from a limited number of 
qualified investors.  According to information published in the "The City UK" (TCU) report 2, 
at the end of 2011, there were more than 9,800 HFs reported worldwide with an asset value 
under management of $1.9 trillion. This value was still below the $2.15 trillion maximum 
reached at the end of 2007. New York and London are the two largest HF centres holding 
around 42 and 18 percent, respectively, of the total world’s HF assets. In Europe, London is 
the largest HF centre, holding $395bn, roughly 70 percent of the total European HF assets. In 
the European Union (EU) there are about 1,500 HFs with two-thirds of these funds located in 
London.  
Unlike banks, mutual funds and other financial institutions, HFs are pooled private 
investment vehicles that have largely escaped financial regulations. For instance, they are not 
required to disclose specific information to financial markets, regulators or databases about 
their performance, asset holdings and risk management procedures. This contributes to their 
reputation for being the least transparent major participants in the financial markets. With the 
2007 financial crisis, they came, however, under closer scrutiny from regulators. Within the 
EU institutions and some EU’s member countries, such as France, Germany, and the UK, 
public discussions were initiated in order to comply with a set of new regulations for the 
finance system. In 2011 a new legislative law, named the “alternative investment fund 
manager directive” (AIFMD), was proposed by the EU and fully implemented by all member 
states in 2013. It introduces a new set of risk management procedures and risk management 
monitoring measures and imposes some constraints on the HF leverage and remuneration of 
senior staff members3. More recently, in December 2013, the European commission adopted a 
Delegated Regulation 4  which supplements the AIFMD act. It defines some regulatory 
technical standards so as to determine whether an Alternative Investment Fund Manager 
(AIFM) is an AIFM open-ended AIF(s) and/or closed-ended AIF(s).   
The specificities of HFs and of their managerial characteristics combined with the ongoing 
discussions, particularly in the U.S. and the EU, for imposing more restrictive regulation on 
the financial markets, with obvious implications on the HF industry, provided us with a 
unique opportunity to review the last two decades of academic literature on HF.  
																																								 																				
2  TheCityUK (March 2012), “Financial Market Series: HFs”. 
3 EU, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund  
Managers and amending directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC, 15053/1/10 (27 October 2010) at Chapter III and 
Chapter IV. 
4 	Delegated regulation (EU) No. 694/2014 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU. 
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The contribution of this paper is four-fold: (i) summarizes the literature on HF (ii) provides an 
alternative classification for the HF literature which makes it easier to identify both the most 
relevant contributions and the gaps in the literature; (iii) suggests which critical problems 
have been “solved” and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed; 
(iv) suggests new avenues for research and for new regulation related to HF and discusses the  
managerial characteristics of HFs addressed in the literature which may affect HF 
performance (a companion paper addresses the literature on HF risk management 
characteristics).  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we identify some key HF 
characteristics and discuss the effect of these characteristics on the HF performance. In 
section 3 we review HF papers which consider the effect of managerial characteristics on HF 
performance. In section 4 we conclude. 
2. Hedge fund’s characteristics 
2.1. Managerial compensation and fee structure 
 
Typically the HF fee structure is divided into an asset based (or flat-rate) management fee and 
a performance-based (option-like) incentive fee, with the latter dependent on the “high water 
mark” (HWM)5 and the “hurdle rate” (HR) provisions.6 As the HF’s manager (HFM) only 
shares the upside profit, so such an incentive fee contract (IFC) can be seen as a call option 
written by the investor on the HF’s asset with a strike price determined by the HR, HWM 
provision and the net asset value at which each investor invests in the fund. The investments 
in the HF are associated with different net asset values (i.e. the net asset value of the HF at the 
time of each investment), consequently, the option-like performance fee has a strike price that 
varies with the time and is specific to each investor, and the overall IFC of the HFM is similar 
to a portfolio of call options each with, potentially, different strike prices.  
Several authors have examined the effect of “incentive fees” (IF) on HF’s performance and 
arrived at contradicting conclusions. For instance, Ackermann et al. (1999), Liang (1999), and 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) study the association between IF and risk-adjusted 
performance and report a statistically significant positive association between them. Their 
results suggest that IF is an effective tool to align the interest of both managers and investors. 
																																								 																				
5 HWM provision ensures that the HFM does not get his incentive fee unless the fund’s net asset value exceeds its 
previous maximum net asset value. For example, the fund asset value in 2010 is $500M and the investment value 
falls to $300k. In 2011 the funds make a 100% return and the asset value is now $600M. The investors would only 
have to pay performance fees on that gain between the $500M and $600M, not the full 100% gain.  
6 HR provision is the minimum return necessary to overcome in order the HFM to receive an IF. This rate is 
usually tied to a benchmark such as LIBOR or one-year Treasury bill rate. For example, suppose the HFM sets a 
HR of 5% and the fund returns is 15% on a year, so the IF relate the 10% return above the HR and not to the 15% 
return. 
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Anson (2001) uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to determine a suitable value for 
the option-like IFC and concludes that this option has a significant value and the 
performance-based incentive fee along with the requirement for HFM having their own 
money invested in the fund are the best ways to alignment the interests of both managers and 
investors. Koh et al. (2003) and Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) report, however, results 
which show a statistically significant negative coefficient for the association between IFC and 
HF’s performance (HFP).  
The literature above examines the impact of managerial incentives, proxied by the 
performance incentive fee, on the HFP. Other authors study the relationship between the 
HWM and the HFP. For instance, the Agarwal et al. (2009) work is based on the assumption 
that the IF percentage rate does not explain performance. They use instead the delta7 of the 
call option underlying the IFC along with the HR and the HWM provision and conclude that 
the HFs with better performances have higher option deltas and include an HWM. Liang and 
Schwarz (2011) investigate whether the managerial pay-performance compensation structure 
is able to reduce agency costs. They examine the effects of the HFM’s decisions to close 
funds to new investors to prevent diseconomies of scale and report evidence that managers do 
not close funds unless there is a significant diseconomy of scale. Agarwal and Ray (2011) 
study the determinants and consequences of fee changes and whether the structure of fee 
changes (i.e. management fee percentage rate, IF, and HWM provision) are related to each 
other and to the fund’s past performance and expectations for the future performance, using a 
dataset comprising information on the HF fee structure, for the period between April 2008 
and November 2010. Their results suggest that the IF tend to increase over time and that this 
tendency is more frequent in younger and smaller HF than in older and larger HF. It appears 
that investors view the increase in the fee as a signal of managerial ability and reward those 
funds with a higher investment. 
The above literature treats HF compensation fees as fixed payments, once they are made. 
Schwarz (2007) provides, however, a detailed cross-sectional analysis of fee variation and 
studies the effect on HFP and cash flow showing that management fees and IF are positively 
correlated with the lock up period which means that managers charging higher fees tend to 
have longer lock-up periods in their funds. However, investors do not view these fee levels as 
a signal of better future performance. 
 
As mentioned earlier, HFMs hold a portfolio of call options on the HF value. The value of 
this portfolio of call options increases with the increase of the volatility of the HF value and 
																																								 																				
7 The delta of the call option embedded in the IFC represents the “dollar increase” in the HFM’s compensation for 
a “one dollar” increase in HF net asset value. 
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the HFMs exercise these options if, at the maturity of the options, the value of the assets 
under management exceeds the strike price of the (IF) call options8. Fung and Hsieh (1997) 
find that when the IFC is out of the money, i.e. the current HF value is below the strike price 
of the underlying call options, contractual constraints, and reputational concerns may prevent 
managers from increasing risk. It appears that, once a good reputation is built, HFM tend to 
preserve it by following less risky management strategies.  
Brown et al. (2001) examine the association between the risk taken by HFM and reputational 
or career-management related concerns and conclude that poor relative performance and low-
risk premium increases the probability of HF termination and that the subsequent related 
reputation cost offsets the effect of IFC on risk taking. This pattern is more evident, however, 
for out-of-the-money (call options) IFC. Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) examine the effect 
of the characteristics of the IFC on the RM behaviour of the HFM and show that HFs with 
IFC have higher downside risk than HFs without IFC, and that risk-taking behaviour is 
significantly reduced when HFM invest their own money in a proportion higher than 30% of 
the total value of the fund. 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
2.2. Managerial flexibility 
The lockup period is a window of time where investors are not permitted to redeem or sell 
shares. This period in addition to both redemption and notice periods are considered to be 
unique characteristics of HF which impose constraints on cash outflows avoiding liquidity 
problems. It is generally argued that imposing such constraints on investors enhances the 
possibility of generating higher returns by pursuing, for instance, long-term arbitrage 
strategies. Aragon (2007) finds that HF with lockup period constraints have higher excess 
returns than HF without lockup periods, and show that there is a negative relationship 
between share restrictions9 and the liquidity of the fund's portfolio. Liang (1999), Koh et al. 
(2003) and Agarwal et al. (2009) report a positive relationship between HF returns and the 
length of the lockup period. Liang and Schwarz (2011) also show that the higher the 
investors’ cash outflow restrictions, defined as the sum of the lockup period, redemption 
notice period and redemption period in months, the lower is the likelihood of the fund closure 
and the higher is the loss in performance over time. 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
																																								 																				
8 A relevant research question, however, is whether an increase in the HF volatility does carry a proportional extra 
management costs. 
9 Share restrictions: include Lockup and redemption periods. 
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2.3. Size and age 
Liang (1999) and Koh et al. (2003) study the effect of HF size, proxied by the HF assets value 
under management, on HFP and both arrive at the conclusion that the larger the size of the HF 
the better is the performance. It appears that HFs of larger size benefit from economies of 
scale and are more likely to attract new investors. Getmansky (2004) find, however, that there 
is a concave negative relationship between HFP and the size of the assets under management. 
This finding suggests that there is an optimal asset value size to maximize return. The optimal 
asset size depends, however, on several variables, whose effect on performance can offset 
each other, such as past returns, fund flows, market impact and competition in the industry 
(i.e. for instance, HFs in illiquid categories are subject to high market impact and have limited 
investment opportunities and are therefore more likely to exhibit a different optimal size 
compared with those in more liquid HF categories). Herzberg and Mozes (2003), Teo (2009) 
and Hedges (2009) provide evidence supporting the results of  Getmansky (2004).  
Agarwal et al. (2009) examine the effect of HF size and fund flows on returns and show that 
there is a negative association between the size of the HFs and the evolution of the cash flows 
over time, which suggests that there is a decreasing return to HF size. Moerth (2007) uses 
multi-factor regression models to examine the relationship between HF size, evolution of HF 
flows over time and HFP, considering the following regression variables: return, standard 
deviation, Sharpe ratio and alpha per asset class, and a data sample that comprises 4,699 HFs 
collected from the period between January 1994 and April 2005. His results show that on 
average larger HFs do not take advantage of the economies of scale but, on the contrary, there 
is a significant negative relationship between HF size and performance. He also studies 
whether HF allocates new capital efficiently as the inflows increase and shows that periods 
with high asset inflows are typically followed by periods where returns are below average. 
However, Kazemi and Schneeweis (2003) and Gregoriou and Rouah (2003), using the 
stochastic discount factor approach and regression analysis for the period from 1994 till 1999, 
find no evidence of the effect of fund sizes on HF returns. 
Liang (1999) finds a negative relationship between HF performance and the age of the HFM 
and concludes that HFM of “young funds” (YF) 10 work harder to build up a reputation and 
consequently their funds achieve higher return performance. Howell (2001) defines YF as 
“funds with less than three years” and examines the association between the HF age (of young 
funds and seasoned funds11) and HF performance. His results provide evidence that YF has 
																																								 																				
10 Young funds are referred to funds with less than 5 years. 
11 Seasoned funds are funds that have been in the business for at least 5 years. 
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higher returns than seasoned funds. Koh et al. (2003) devotes his attention to the Asian HF 
industry and find no evidence that YF outperforms seasoned funds.  
 
<Insert Table 3> 
2.4. Diversification 
The quest for creating the optimal mixture of HFs in a portfolio (i.e. to create funds of HFs) 
has grown enormously in the last decades, as an alternative way to generating a higher 
absolute return and optimising hedging strategies. We identify three main branches of the 
literature on funds of HF. One branch mainly studies the effect on performance of increasing 
the number of HFs in a portfolio of HFs. Two good contributions to this literature were given 
by Lhabitant and Learned (2002) and Amin and Kat (2002). The former article tests the effect 
of diversification on randomly chosen and equally-weighted HF portfolios, using a sample of 
6,985 HFs from the time period of 1990 to 2001, and conclude that the greatest benefits of 
portfolio diversification are achieved when the portfolio of HF does not include more than ten 
HFs, the latter examines the performance of a randomly selected basket of HFs whose size 
range from 1 to 20 funds and conclude that portfolios with less than 15 HFs have a more 
efficient risk-return profile.12  
The second branch of literature studies the effect on the performance of combining portfolios 
of HFs with other traditional investments (e.g. stocks and bonds). Amin and Kat (2002) 
examine the effect on HF performance of including HFs into a traditional portfolio of stocks 
and bonds. Amin and Kat (2003) investigate the risk-return trade-off for individual funds and 
portfolio of funds when mixed with the S&P 500 stock index. Both of the studies provide 
evidence that HFs do not provide superior risk-return trade-off than traditional investments, 
but also that mixing HFs with stocks, bonds, and/or indices (such as S&P 500) can generate 
higher and more efficient payoff profiles enhancing the risk-return relationship. The above 
studies also suggest that above a certain number of HFs, adding an extra HF to the portfolio 
affects the skewness and kurtosis in such a way that reduces the benefits of diversification. 
The best results are obtained when HF added represent only 10-20% of fund assets. Davies et 
al. (2009) adopt the “polynomial goal programming” (PGP) optimization method in order to 
allocate capital across different HF strategies while incorporating investor preferences for 
higher return moments such as co-skewness and co-kurtosis, instead of normal skewness and 
kurtosis, and find that incorporating stocks and bonds into a portfolio of HFs leads to lower 
kurtosis and higher skewness compared to stand-alone HFs.  
																																								 																				
12 Efficient risk-return profile is referred as a profile which is able to yield the highest return with the lowest risk 
possible.  
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The third branch of literature focuses on how to construct an optimal portfolio of HFs 
considering both the risk and the return characteristics. The mean-variance approach is a 
widely used approach. Amenc and Martellini (2002), Terhaar et al. (2003) and Alexander and 
Dimitriu (2004) consider such an approach. The mean-variance methodology is based on the 
assumption that returns follow a normal distribution. When this assumption does not hold the 
above methodology does not yield appropriate results. Hence, alternative approaches have 
been developed. One is called the expected utility framework, which is used, for instance, by 
Barès et al. (2002) who investigate the relation between the HF allocation problem and the 
uncertainty of the HF survival. More specifically, they use a generic algorithm to study the 
effect of survival probabilities and investment constraints on the optimal capital allocation 
and the certainty equivalent of HF’s portfolios. Davies et al. (2009) develop a technique to 
allocate capital across different HF strategies and traditional asset classes which incorporate 
investors’ preference for higher moments into a PGP function solved for multiple competing 
HF allocation objective functions within a 4-moment framework (mean-variance-skewness-
kurtosis). They highlight the importance of constructing ‘like for like’ representative 
portfolios that reflect the investment opportunities available to different-sized funds and show 
the importance of the equity market neutral funds as volatility and kurtosis reducers and of the 
global macro funds as portfolio skewness enhancers.  
Hagelin and Pramborg (2003), Popova et al. (2006), Jurczenko and Maillet (2006) also use a 
similar analysis to study HF portfolio optimization. Giamouridis and Vrontos (2007) are the 
first to use dynamic specification for the covariance parameters and to evaluate the 
consequences at the portfolio allocation level. They examine time-varying variance and 
covariance/correlations of HF returns by concentrating on the potential impact of HF portfolio 
construction and find that the “regime switching dynamic correlation model” (RSCM) ranks 
first in term of reducing portfolio risk, improving the out-of-sample risk-adjusted realized 
returns, and achieving the lowest “C-VaR” among the alternative covariance models, whereas 
the full factor multivariate GARCH model ranks second. Adam et al. (2008) use risk 
measurements to construct optimal portfolios under risk constraints. They assess risk, 
focusing on moment-based, distortion, and spectral risk measures, and provide comparative 
analyses of efficient portfolios. Their optimal portfolios selection with respect to the choice of 
risk measures show that the use of risk measures which are focused on identifying the 
likelihood of large losses lead to slightly more diversified portfolios. Krokhmal et al. (2002), 
Favre and Galeano (2002), and Agarwal and Naik (2004) construct optimal portfolios using 
alternative risk measures.  
Rockafellar et al. (2006) propose generalized measures of deviation instead of standard 
deviation to cope with the uncertainty in attaining rates of return beyond the risk-free rate in 
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the framework of portfolio optimization theory. The conditional value-at-risk measure is an 
example of such measures used, which may reflect different risk attitudes from different 
classes of investors. This approach covers discrete distributions along with continuous 
distributions which can be applied to portfolios involving derivatives.  
<Insert Table 4> 
2.5. Trading strategies 
2.5.1. Use of derivatives 
To our best knowledge Chen (2011) is the first paper to use empirical information to examine 
the effect of financial derivatives use on risk taking and HF performance. It uses a sample of 
over 5,000 HFs from the period of 1994 to 2006 and identifies the determinants of derivatives 
use. It also finds that the use of derivatives is more likely in funds with higher incentive fees, 
fewer redemption restrictions and where managers have invested their own money and 
auditing is more effective. Finally, it tests whether investors differentiate the derivatives users 
from the derivative non-users and finds that the use of derivatives has little influence on the 
relationship between flow and performance.    
2.5.2. Leverage 
Ang et al. (2011) is the first study examining the determinants of HFs leverage13. They use a 
sample of funds of HFs from the time period of December 2004 to October 2009 and report 
that the HF leverage is modest and countercyclical (i.e. it decreased prior to the 2007 financial 
crisis and increased afterwards). For instance, during 2008 HFs reported the lowest leverage 
whereas the investment bank sector reported the highest leverage. Before 2008, both 
industries had, however, similar leverage exposure, which means that the deleveraging of the 
HF sector was due to the asset withdrawals over 2007 and not due to a change in HF industry 
leverage policy. They also conclude that HF leverage is more predictable if one rely on 
economy-wide factors rather than on HF’s characteristics. For instance, a decrease in funding 
costs and an increase in market value, as well as a decrease in the volatility of the HF returns, 
are all good indicators of an increase in the future of the HF leverage. 
McGuire and Tsatsaronis (2008), among others, provide an indirect method to estimate the 
average amount of the HF leverage, using an extension of regression-based style analysis with 
																																								 																				
13 Prior work on HF leverage used many different methods of collecting or computing the HFs’ leverage but 
without using actual leverage data as in Ang et al (2011) paper. For example, some papers used static leverage 
ratios taken directly from fund databases. For example the work of Schneeweis et al. (2005) who empirically 
investigate the relationship between HFs leverage and their risk-return relationship using leverage at a point in 
time database. They find, on a strategy level, a systemic relationship between leverage and standard deviation, 
whereas on a fund level, they report little evidence of a systematic relationship between the use of leverage and the 
level of risk-adjusted performance. Some other articles rely on direct estimates for HF leverage such as Banque de 
France (2007) and Lo (2008). 
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time-varying betas and based on publicly available data on HF returns. This study considers 
non-linear exposures, through the use of synthetic option returns, as possible risk factors, and 
requires a careful specification of the model factors to avoid omitted variable bias. Duffie et 
al. (2009) and Dai and Sundaresan (2010) develop theoretical models to determine the 
optimal leverage considering the finding costs, insolvency risk and management fees. 
<Insert Table 5> 
2.6. Performance persistency 
Unlike traditional investment vehicles, investments in HFs impose restrictions on cash 
outflow such as long lock up and notice periods. Hence, before investing investors study 
carefully the expected long-term performance fund. The persistence in performance relates to 
the ability of the HFM to add value and generate absolute returns over time. Brown et al. 
(1999) conduct one of the early studies on HF performance and do not find evidence of 
annual return persistence for the sample time period between 1989 and 1995. Agarwal and 
Naik (2000), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Kat and Menexe (2002), Barès et al. (2003), Koh 
et al. (2003) and Baquero et al. (2005) find evidence that contradicts the above results. Their 
results show the existence of a strong persistency in a good performance over short-term 
periods (i.e. monthly and quarterly) which decrease when one consider for longer time 
periods.  
Boyson and Cooper (2004) developed a regression model which identifies quarterly 
performance persistence during the tenure of the HFM. Their results show that over quarterly 
time periods the best young manager outperforms the annual return of the worse old managers 
by 9 percent. Capocci (2009) also analyses performance persistence in HF returns and finds 
that there is a consistent and systematic way to create pure alpha, using risk-return trade-off 
measures (through the Sharpe score), a pure volatility measure (through the standard 
deviation) and the beta exposure. He finds that HFs offering stable returns with limited 
volatility and/or with a limited exposure to the equity market consistently and significantly 
outperform equity and bond markets for both bullish and bearish markets. Abdou and 
Nasereddin (2011) study performance persistence of some strategies for different economic 
periods using the support vector mechanism (SVM), the neural network (NN) and the 
ordinary least square (OLS) methodologies. They find that the SVM has better prediction 
accuracy than the NN and OLS, and the HF returns performance related to different strategies 
are not persistent over the long-term. Indeed, only the returns of emerging market strategy 
were persistent during the recession14.  
																																								 																				
14 Emerging Market Strategy is part of Equity Long/Short HF style. They invest in all types of securities in 
emerging countries, including equities, bonds and sovereign debt. 
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Tudor and Cao (2012) examine the ability of HFs and funds of HFs to generate a consistent 
absolute return over time, using Bayesian multinomial probit and regular multinomial logit 
regressions. They find that HFs which use Options Arbitrage, Fixed Income, Global Macro, 
Emerging Markets strategies, or are Event Driven, have a significantly better chance of 
producing absolute returns, but there is no evidence of performance persistence in absolute 
return when the HF’s strategies and characteristics are taken into account. Cumming et al. 
(2012) show that financial regulation can enhance or mitigate returns performance persistence. 
They use a sample of HFs from 48 countries for 1994 to 2008 and identify three main types of 
regulations affecting returns performance persistence: (i) minimum capital restrictions, which 
restrict lower quality funds and hence increase the likelihood of performance persistence, (ii) 
restrictions on the location of key service providers, which restrict human capital choices and 
hence tend to mitigate performance persistence, and (iii) distribution channels, which make 
the HF performance more opaque, decreasing the likelihood of performance persistence. 
<Insert Table 6> 
 
3. Managerial characteristics 
3.1. Career concern and talent 
Over the last two decades, an extensive empirical literature has been developed which helps 
to better understand the risk-return properties of HFs. Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, 
the study of the association between the managerial characteristics and performance of  HFs 
has been neglected. Boyson (2005) examines the effect of career concerns on HF’s 
managerial behaviour and the association between changes in managerial behaviour and the 
HF performance. More specifically, she analyses the effect of the years of experience and the 
age of the HFM on the HFM’s risk-taking behaviour. Her results show that additional years of 
experience leads to less risk-taking behaviour and lower return performance. Boyson 
identifies several possible reasons for this negative relationship: (i) older HFM with larger HF 
earns get higher fees and this lead them to take less risk, (ii) older HFM usually have 
significant personal assets in their funds and this lead them to be more cautious, (iii) older 
HFM know that higher risk-taking increases the probability of default which, if it occurs, 
penalizes more older HFM than younger HFM.  
More recently, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) apply the framework of Boyson (2005) to analyse 
the effect of the HFM age on HF returns performance. Their data sample focuses, however, 
on emerging HF only. They use recently established HF as a proxy for emerging funds and 
emerging managers and evaluate separately HFM of recently established funds, who have 
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previously run a fund listed in the database, and HFM who have not previously run an HF 
listed in the database. Their results show that HFM of emerging HFs have stronger financial 
incentives for better performance than HFM of established funds and emerging HFs are more 
open to new investors than older HFs. They also report that emerging HF are able to generate 
higher abnormal returns performance in the first two years and that for each additional year of 
age after the first two years the return performance decreases by 42 basis points on average. 
Li et al. (2011) provide an empirical analysis of the impact of HFM characteristics on HF 
performance, based on more than 4,000 HFs for the period between 1994 and 2003. They use 
“intelligence” and “education” as proxies for “talent” and “career concern”, respectively. 
They also include other variables such as the composite SAT score for the manager’s 
undergraduate institution, the number of years of working experience, the number of years of 
working experience at a specific HF and the age of the HFM. They show that HFMs from 
higher SAT undergraduate institutions tend to take less risk and have higher raw15 and risk-
adjusted returns and more inflows.  
 
3.2. Timing ability 
In previous sections, we reviewed the HF literature which focuses on the ability of the HFM 
to generate absolute returns. In this section, we focus on the HF literature which studies the 
timing ability of the HFM (i.e. the HFM’s ability to invest in the right securities at the right 
time). The main approach that has been proposed to evaluate the timing ability is the “return-
based measure”. The most popular market timing models derived from this measure are those 
of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Merton (1981). Fung et al. (2002) use the traditional capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) and the Henriksson and Merton (1981) model.  
Aragon (2003) extends the timing model of Merton (1981) and conclude that HFM do not 
show any general market investment timing ability. Most of the HF literature shows, however, 
that HFM are able to optimize the timing of their investments at least under some 
circumstances. For instance, Aragon (2003) shows that HFM have positive (negative) market 
timing investment ability when they hold liquid (illiquid) portfolios. Chen (2004) uses the 
concept of focus markets (i.e. markets where HFs trade most actively) and finds evidence of 
successful market timing at both the individual and style16 levels. Chen and Liang (2007) test 
for timing ability in both market level (bear or bull markets) and market volatility on the US 
equity HF market, and report economically and statistically significant evidence of timing 
ability at both individual and aggregate fund levels. Moreover, they state that timing ability 
																																								 																				
15 	Raw returns are the returns directly extracted from the database without any modification. 
16 In order to compare return performance, risk and other HF’s characteristics, HFs are categorized according to 
investment strategies (“styles”) - e.g. Long/Short, Relative value, Event driven, and Tactical trading. 
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appears especially strong during bear markets or when the market is more volatile, indicating 
that funds provide investors with protection against unfavourable market conditions. Cai and 
Liang (2012) use a dynamic linear regression model and find significant timing skill related to 
market return, liquidity, and volatility. Cao et al. (2013) investigate the HF managerial ability 
to take advantage of the market liquidity and conclude the existence of persistence timing 
skill over time. 
<Insert Table 7> 
4. Conclusion 
This paper summarizes the literature on HF developed over the last two decades, particularly 
that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion paper considers risk 
management characteristics). We classify the current HF literature, and suggest new avenues 
for research considering the recent developments. We highlight the importance of the 
managerial characteristics on the risk-taking and HF performance, and the successes and the 
shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools and 
financial regulation. We discuss past development patterns in the literature and some critical 
problems which have been “solved” or have not been yet adequately addressed.  
The tables in the Appendix are helpful to identify both the gaps in the HF literature and the 
most relevant contributions in different research areas.   
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Describes the Managerial Compensation characteristics of the HFs (Fee structure and Compensation and risk behaviour) 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
1- Fees Structure 
Ackermann et al. 
(1999) 
Test the relationship between risk-adjusted 
performance and incentive fee Sharpe ratio 
1- A strong relation between Sharpe ratio and incentive fees. 
2- Incentive fees are effective in aligning manager and 
investor interests and attracting top managers 
MAR and HFR 906 1988- 1995 
Liang (1999) Study the effect of incentive fees on fund's performance 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
1- Incentive fees are highly positively significant with respect 
to the performance. 2- Management fees are not significantly 
related to performance 
HFR 385 Jan. 1994- Dec. 1996 
Anson (2001) Determine a suitable value for the option-like incentive fee contract 
Black-Scholes option pricing 
model 
The performance-based incentive fee along with managerial 
investment should lead to better alignment of interest between 
the manager and the investors 
NA 
Edward and 
Caglayan (2001) 
Examine the Incentive fee- Performance 
relationship within two groups of HFs 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
1- Incentive fees are positively related to performance. 2- 
high-incentive funds paying incentive fees of 20% or more 
earn an annualized excess return of about 3-6% higher than 
funds that pay lower incentive fees (less than 20%) 
MAR/Hedge 1458 
Jan. 1990- 
Aug. 
1998 
Koh et al. (2003) Study the effect of incentive fees on fund's performance 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
Negative coefficient on the performance fees which indicates 
no evidence of a relationship between higher returns and 
higher incentive fees 
Asian Hedge and 
Eureka Hedge 417 
Jan. 1999- 
Mar. 2003 
Kouwenberg and 
Ziemba (2002) 
Study the effect of incentive fees on both 
absolute and risk-adjusted returns 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
The negative coefficient on the performance fees which 
indicates no evidence of a relationship between higher returns 
and higher incentive fees. 
Zurich HF 
Universe 
1242 Funds 
and 451 
FoHF 
Jan. 1995- 
Nov. 
2000 
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Agarwal et al. 
(2009) 
Investigate the effect of managerial 
incentives  proxied by (Delta of HF 
managers, Hurdle rate, and High-water mark 
provisions) 
Regression analysis 
Funds do perform better with better managerial incentives 
represented by higher delta and the inclusion of high-water 
mark. 
CISDM, HFR, 
MSCI, and 
TASS 
Total of 7535 
Funds 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2002 
Liang and 
Schwarz (2011) 
Investigate whether the  pay-performance 
compensation structure of fund managers has 
any effect on fund managers’ decisions to 
limit investments 
Regression analysis 
1- Managers do not close funds before the occurrence of 
significant diseconomies of scale since closure shifts funds 
from outperforming to average performance. 
TASS 
Varies 
according to 
each year 
1999- 
2010 2- The higher the investor outflow restrictions the lower is the 
closure likelihood and greater performance loss over time. 
3- High pay-performance deltas are not strong enough to 
prevent overinvestment. 
   	 	 	 	
Schwarz (2007) How hedge fund fee levels influence net performance and flows 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
1- Management and incentive fees are correlated with lock-up 
periods reducing the cross-sectional fee variation. 
TASS 
Varies 
according to 
each year 
1998- 
2006 
2- Negative relationship between funds of hedge fund 
performance and incentive fees. 
3- Large funds charge higher fees and are more likely to raise 
fees level. And Investors do not view fee levels as a signal of 
future fund performance. 
Agarwal and 
Ray (2011) 
Explore the determinates of fee changes and 
whether these changes are related to each 
other and to the fund’s past and future 
performance 
Cross-sectional analysis 
using simple regression 
1- Managers tend to increase their fees more than decreasing 
them over time. This fee increase is more observable in 
younger and smaller fund. 
TASS 3770 
Apr. 
2008- 
Nov. 
2010 
2- Investors view fee increases as a signal of managerial 
ability and reward these funds with higher inflows. 
19	
	
2- Compensation and risk-taking behaviour of HF managers 
Fung and Hsieh 
(1997) 
The role of incentive-fee and the reputation 
value on managerial risk-taking behaviour 
within HFs' survivorship framework 
Regression Analysis 
When the incentive-fee contract is out of the money, 
contractual constraints, and reputational concerns might  
alleviate managers’ tendency to increase variance and risk 
TASS 526 (CTA Funds) 
1990- 
1995 
Brown et al. 
(2001) 
Examine the risk of HFs in light of 
managerial career concerns Regression Analysis 
There is a reputation cost that has a mitigating effect on 
incentives for taking extreme risk, especially when the 
incentive-fee contract is out of the money. 
TASS 715 1989- 1995 
Kouwenberg and 
Ziemba (2007) 
Examine how the incentive fee contract’s 
features might affect the manager’s risk-
taking behaviour within the behavioural 
framework of prospect theory 
Cross-sectional regression 
model 
1- HFs with incentive fees have higher downside risk than 
funds without these contracts. Therefore, funds with incentive 
fee contracts are not riskier than other funds. 
Zurich HF 
Universe 
1242 Funds 
and 451 
FoHF 
Jan. 1995- 
Nov. 
2000 
   
2- Risk-taking behaviour is significantly reduced when 
managers invest their own money (more than 30%) into the 
fund.    
 
20	
	
 
Table 2- The main articles investigating the effects of HF managerial flexibility (Lockup, redemption, and notice periods)	
 
 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
       
Liang (1999) 
Study the relationship between managerial 
flexibility variables and generating higher 
returns 
Regression analysis 
1- the Positive relationship between average returns and lockup 
periods. 2- The longer the lockup periods the fewer cash holdings 
and more investments, resulting in higher returns. 
HFR 385 Jan. 1994- Dec. 1996 
Koh et al. 
(2003) 
Study the relationship between managerial 
flexibility variables and generating higher 
returns 
Regression analysis The positive relation between redemption periods and average returns. 
Asian Hedge and 
Eureka Hedge 417 
Jan. 1999- 
Mar. 2003 
Agarwal et 
al. (2009) 
Study the relationship between managerial 
flexibility variables and generating higher 
returns 
Regression analysis Better future returns are due to greater managerial flexibility in the form of longer redemption and lockup periods. 
CISDM, HFR, 
MSCI, and TASS 
Total of 
7535 Funds 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2002 
Aragon 
(2007) 
 
Study the relationship between HF returns and 
restrictions imposed by funds that limit the 
liquidity of fund investors 
 
Regression analysis 
 
1-Excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are 4-7% higher 
than those of no lockup funds. 
TASS 3354 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2001 
2- the Negative relationship between share restrictions and the 
liquidity of the fund's portfolio (Investors' share illiquidity premium). 
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Table 3- Describes the major studies on HF size and age 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Liang (1999) Study the effect of fund size on the fund's performance Regression analysis 
The larger the fund the better the performance due to 
economies of scale or attracting more money. HFR 385 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 1996 
Koh et al. (2003) Study the effect of fund size on the fund's performance in the Asian market Regression analysis 
The larger the fund the better the performance due to 
economies of scale or attracting more money. 
Asian Hedge and 
Eureka Hedge 417 
Jan. 1999- 
Mar. 2003 
Getmansky 
(2004) 
Study the effect of fund size on the 
fund's performance Regression analysis 
1- The Concave relationship between performance and 
assets under management. 
TASS 3501 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2002 2- An optimal asset size can be obtained by balancing out 
the effects of past returns, fund flows, market impact, 
competition and favourable category positioning. 
Agarwal et al. 
(2009) 
Study the effect of fund size and 
investors’ money flows on 
performance 
Regression analysis 
Find that worse future performance is reported due to both 
larger hedge funds and greater cash flows due to decreasing 
returns to scale. 
CISDM, HFR, MSCI, 
and TASS 
Total of 
7535 
Funds 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2002 
Gregoriou and 
Rouah (2003) 
Study the impact of fund size on HF 
returns Regression analysis No evidence for any impact of fund size on HF returns. 
Zurich HF Universe, 
and LaPorte asset 
Allocation System 
204 1994- 1999 
Moerth (2007) 
Analyze the relationship between fund 
size, fund flows, and performance (HF 
return, SD, Sharpe ratio, and Alpha) 
Cross-sectional analysis using 
simple regression 
1- On average large funds cannot take advantage of their 
economies of scale. On the contrary, a significant negative 
relationship between fund size and hedge fund performance 
is revealed. TASS and CISDM 4699 Jan. 1994- Apr. 2005 
2- Periods with high asset inflows in individual funds are 
typically followed by periods of below average returns. 
Liang (1999) Investigate the relationship between fund age and performance Regression analysis 
The negative relationship between fund’s performance and 
age because managers of young funds work harder to build 
up the fund’s reputation hence achieving higher returns. 
HFR 385 Jan. 1994- Dec. 1996 
Koh et al. (2003) 
Investigate the relationship between 
fund age and performance in the Asian 
market 
Regression analysis No relationship between fund age and performance in the Asian market. 
Asian Hedge and 
Eureka Hedge 417 
Jan. 1999- 
Mar. 2003 
Howell (2001) 
Study the relationship between the 
fund age (young and seasoned funds) 
and their performance 
Regression analysis Superior returns for young funds over their seasoned peers. NA NA NA 
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Table 4- The main contributions in the HF literature studying the diversification of HF 
Name Objective Modelling/ Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Increasing the Number of HFs in a Portfolio 
Lhabitant and 
Learned (2002) 
1- Test the effect of 
diversification on randomly 
chosen and equally-weighted HF 
portfolios 
Naïve diversification strategies/ Mean-
Variance Framework 
1- Validates the usefulness of HF portfolio as an 
investment vehicle, since they show that 
increasing the number of HFs in the portfolio 
will decrease the volatility and downside risk 
while keeping a steady level of returns 
MAR, HFR, 
TASS, EACM, 
and Private 
resources 
6985 1990- 2001 
 
2- Examine the effect of naively 
increasing the number of HFs in a 
portfolio 
Naïve diversification strategies/ Mean-
Variance Framework 
2- To get the best benefits from portfolio 
diversification, the portfolio should be of a small 
size not including more than 10 HFs  
Amin and Kat 
(2002) 
Examine the performance of a 
randomly selected basket of HFs 
ranging in size from 1 to 20 funds 
Mean-VaR Framework 
To achieve a more efficient risk-return profile 
one needs to combine a small number of funds 
(less than 15 funds).  
TASS 
455 
(Artificially 
created) 
1994- 2001 
Mixing HFs with a Portfolio of Traditional Investments 
Amin and Kat 
(2002) 
Examine the diversification effect 
from including hedge funds into a 
traditional portfolio of stocks and 
bonds 
Mean-VaR Framework 
1- HFs inclusion in the portfolio will 
significantly enhance the mean-variance 
efficiency. However, the skewness and kurtosis 
will reduce this diversification benefit 
TASS 
455   
(Artificially 
created) 
1994-2001 
2- To have some impact on the overall portfolio, 
an allocation should be made to HFs exceeding 
the typical 1-5% that is normally considered. 
Amin and Kat 
(2003) 
Investigate the risk-return trade-
off for individual, portfolio and 
indices of hedge funds 
Continuous time version of Dybvig's 
(1988) payoff distribution pricing model 
1- HFs do not offer any risk-return superiority as 
a stand-alone investment. However, they 
produce an efficient payoff profile when mixed 
with the S &P 500. MAR 
77 HFs, 13 HF 
indices 
May1990- 
Apr. 2000 
2- The best results are obtained when 10-20% of 
the portfolio value is invested in HFs 
Hagelin and 
Pramborg (2003) 
Examine the gains from adding 
hedge funds into portfolios of 
stocks and bonds allowing for 
different moments of the return 
distribution to affect the analysis 
Discrete-time investment model 
1- Statistically significant gains for most of the 
strategies investigated from adding HFs to the 
portfolios of stocks and bonds.  
2- HFs enter the risk neutral portfolio as well as 
the most risk-averse portfolio. 
3,- Allocation to HFs are extensive at time 
HFR index NA Jan. 1990- Oct. 2002 
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Davies et al. (2009) 
Test investors’ preferences for 
higher moments such as skewness 
and kurtosis to solve for capital 
allocation problem in the HF 
Polynomial Goal Programming (PGP) 
optimization method 
Incorporating stocks and bonds in a portfolio of 
HFs make it more favourable in terms of less 
kurtosis and higher skewness compared to 
another portfolio of only HFs 
TASS 348 June1994- May 2001 
Optimal HF Portfolio 
Amenc and 
Martellini (2002) 
  
Allocate the optimal portfolio of 
HFs through the risk and return 
characteristics within an 
improved estimator of the 
covariance structure of HF index 
return 
  
The mean-variance approach 
  
1- Strongly indicates that optimal inclusion of 
HFs in an investor portfolio can potentially 
generate a dramatic decrease in the portfolio 
volatility CSFB/Tremont 
HF indices NA 1994- 2000 2- Differences in mean returns are not 
statistically significant suggesting that 
improvements in terms of risk control does not 
necessarily come at the cost of lower expected 
returns 
Terhaar et al. (2003) 
Evaluate the portfolio policy 
allocation of HFs within time and 
liquidity constraints 
The mean-variance approach 
The longer the investor's horizon and the lower 
the need for liquidity, the greater will be the 
allocation to the illiquid alternative investments 
NA NA NA 
Alexander and 
Dimitriu (2004) 
Developing a portfolio 
construction model specifically 
designed for fund of hedge funds 
incorporating specific controls for 
operational limitations, data bias, 
and incompleteness 
The mean-variance approach 
Fund selection method based on factor models’ 
alpha estimates greatly improves the 
performance of HF portfolios optimized to have 
minimum variance. 
HFR 282 Jan. 1990- May 2003 
Davies et al. (2009) 
How to allocate capital across 
different hedge fund strategies 
and traditional asset classes while 
incorporating investors' 
preference within a 4 moments 
framework (Mean-Variance-
Skewness-Kurtosis) 
Polynomial goal programming 
optimization function (PGP) 
1- Emphasizes the importance of constructing 
‘like for like’ representative portfolios that 
reflect the investment opportunities available to 
different-sized funds 
TASS 348 Jun.1994- May 2001 
2- Highlights the importance of equity market 
neutral funds as volatility and kurtosis reducers 
and of global macro funds as portfolio skewness 
enhancers. 
Popova et al. (2006) 
Examine the effects of semi-
variance, conditional third and 
fourth moments on portfolio 
allocations to HFs 
Higher moment analysis/ Stochastic 
programming models 
Substantial allocation to HFs is justified even 
with consideration for the highly unusual 
kurtosis and skewness 
CISDM Top 50 funds in the sample 1994- 2003 
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Giamouridis and 
Vrontos (2007) 
In general, evaluate and identify the optimally constructed portfolio 
HFR index NA Jan. 1990- Aug. 2005 1- Models comparison in terms of 
selecting the optimal portfolio of 
HFs 
Dynamic specification for the covariance 
parameters 
1.. Switching dynamic correlation model 
(RSCM) ranks first in term of reducing portfolio 
risk, improving the out-of-sample risk-adjusted 
realized returns, and achieving the lowest CVaR 
among the alternative covariance models 
Variance and covariance Framework/ 
RSCM, GARCH 
2. The full factor multivariate GARCH model 
ranks second with significant differences. The 
implicit factor GARCH, the implicit factor, and 
sample covariance model rank third, fourth, and 
fifth, respectively.  
Adam et al. (2008) 
The use of risk measurements to 
construct optimal portfolios under 
risk constraints 
Risk measures within Asset Management 
Approach 
1-  Optimal portfolios chosen with respect to the 
choice of risk measures show that risk measures 
that emphasize large losses lead to slightly more 
diversified portfolios 
In line with 
Chabaane et al. 
(2006) 
  
16 
  
Jan. 1990- 
July 2001 
  
      
2- Risk measures that account primarily for 
worst case scenarios overweight funds with 
smaller tails which mitigate the relevance of 
diversification 
Rockafellar et al. 
(2006) 
Propose generalized measures of 
deviation instead of standard 
deviation to cope with the 
uncertainty in attaining rates of 
return beyond the risk-free rate 
Discrete distributions along with 
continuous disturbing 
1- Conditional value-at-risk measure is an 
example of such a measure and can reflect the 
different attitudes of different classes of 
investors 
NA NA NA 
2- The utilized approach can be applied to 
portfolios involving derivatives, as well as to 
financial models involving a finite number of 
scenarios.  
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Table 5- The literature on HFs’ Flexible Trading Strategies (Derivatives and Leverage) 
Name Objective Modelling/ Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
1-Derivatives 
Chen (2011) 
The General aim is to empirically examine the use of derivatives on the risk taking and performance on hedge fund industry 
1- Studies the relationship between 
derivatives use and various fund 
characteristics 
Regression Analysis 
1- Derivatives are more likely to be used by funds imposing 
higher incentive fees,  have less redemption restrictions, 
have managers’ personal money invested, and employ 
effective auditing. 
TASS, 13F 
filings, and TASS 
notes 
4376 1994- 2006 
2- Examines the link between 
derivatives use and HFs risk taking 
profile 
Regression Analysis 
2- Using derivatives is motivated by risk-management 
concerns which imply that derivatives use is associated with 
lower risk 
Empirically there is a significant negative relationship 
between derivatives use and fund risks represented by 
return volatility, market risk, downside risk, and extreme 
event risk 
No significant relationship between fund performance 
based on net-of-fee return and derivatives users and non-
users 
3- Investigate whether derivative users 
have different tendency to shift fund risk Regression Analysis 
Derivative users engage less in risk shifting practice than 
non-derivatives’ users funds 
4- The effect of derivatives' users on 
hedge funds high failure risk 
Hazard model 
methodology 
Strong evidence that derivative use leads to lower 
systematic risk especially with lower downside/event risk. 
Therefore, they mitigate the unfavourable influence of 
severe market conditions on fund operations. 
Derivatives use reflects fund managers’ risk-management 
efforts due to career concerns and reputation costs. 
5- Tests whether investors are able to 
differentiate between derivatives users 
and non-users 
Regression Analysis 5- Derivatives use has little influence on the fund flow-performance relation 
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2-Leverage – The literature on the leverage of HFs 
Ang et al. (2011) 
Investigate the determinants of hedge 
funds’ leverage using actual leverage 
ratios 
Time series analysis 
1- Fund leverage is fairly modest with an average gross 
leverage (including long and short positions) of (2.1) 
* TASS, CISDM, 
Barclay, and 
Private funds 
208 funds of 
hedge funds 
Dec.2004- Oct. 
2009 
2- HF leverage is countercyclical since it decreases prior to 
the start of the financial crisis in mid-2007, whereas a 
continuous increase occurred in the finance and investment 
banks sector 
3- Changes in HF leverage tend to be more predictable by 
economy-wide factors than by fund-specific characteristics 
Schneeweis et al. 
(2005) 
Empirically investigate the relationship 
between hedge funds leverage and their 
risk-return relation 
Correlation and 
Regression Analysis 
1- On a strategy level, a systemic relationship between 
leverage and standard deviation exist. However, it is not a 
positive relationship which indicates that strategies with 
lower volatility generally have higher leverage. CISDM and 
TASS NA 
Jan.2000- 
Mar.2003 
2- On a fund level, little evidence is reported of a 
systematic relationship between the use of leverage and the 
level of risk-adjusted performance. 
McGuire and 
Tsatsaronis (2008) 
Provide an indirect method to estimate 
the average amount of the hedge fund 
leverage 
An extension of 
regression-based style 
analysis with time-
varying betas 
The creation of an approach that estimates the leverage for 
several HF families, in particular, those whose returns are 
well captured by the risk factors used in the estimation 
HFR NA Jan.1996- Jun. 2007 
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Table 6-The main articles investigating the persistency in the HF performance.  
Name Objective Modelling/ Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Brown et al. 
(1999) 
Investigate the annual return 
persistency for offshore HFs 
Year by year cross-sectional 
regression 
No evidence of annual return persistency, no persistent 
winners or losers with either style adjusted fund returns or 
raw fund returns 
Data provided by 
A. Bernheim 
from 78 Funds in 1989 to 
399 Funds in 1995 1989- 1995 
Agarwal and 
Naik (2000) 
1- Compare the performance 
persistence in two-period and 
multiple period frameworks 
Regression-based (parametric) 
and contingency-based (non-
parametric) 
1- The level of persistence in multi-periods is 
considerably smaller than that observed under the two-
period framework, with no persistency at the yearly return 
level in the multi-period framework 
HFR 
746 (with quarterly 
return), 716 (with half-
yearly return), and 586 
(with yearly return) 
Jan. 1982 - 
Dec. 1998 
2- Examine the sensitivity of 
persistence to the length of 
return measurement intervals 
Regression-based (parametric) 
and contingency based (non-
parametric) 
2- Maximum persistence at quarterly horizons (short-term 
persistence), whereas it decreases when moving to yearly 
horizons. 
Edward and 
Caglayan 
(2001) 
Study the persistence in 
performance among winning 
and losing funds 
Parametric and non-parametric 
approach 
Find evidence of performance persistence over one-year 
and two-year horizons among both winners and losers MAR/Hedge 1458 
Jan. 1990- 
Aug. 1998 
Bares et al. 
(2003) 
1- Analyze performance 
persistence over short and 
long-term horizons 
Non-parametric method: Forming 
two groups of 5 portfolios 
containing the best and worst 
managers over (1 to 36) months 
1- Significant short-term persistence (1 to 3 months) with 
vanishing persistence over the long horizon. 
FRM 4934 Jan. 1992- Dec. 2000 2- Analyze the risk-adjusted 
performance persistence in the 
long-term ( 36 months) funds 
APT (Arbitrage pricing theory) 
model 
2- A slight over-reaction at the long-term horizon/ long-
term investors should be cautious about relying on past 
performance measures while making a long-term 
investment in a specific HF. 
Baquero et al. 
(2005) 
Analyze performance 
persistence taking into account 
the look-ahead bias 
Model liquidation of HFs and 
analyze how it depends on 
historical performance after 
eliminating look-ahead bias 
Performance persists over the quarterly horizon and 
decreases over the yearly horizon. TASS 1797 1994- 2000 
Boyson and 
Cooper (2004) 
1- Test HF performance 
persistence over short and 
long horizons 
Multi-factor model to control for 
risk factors 1- No persistence over both short and long horizons. TASS 
1659 (Quarterly), 1503 
(Half-yearly), and 982 
(Yearly) 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2000 
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2- Designing a test to measure 
the persistence by HF 
managers' tenure 
Multi-factor model to control for 
risk factors 
2- Over quarterly time horizon, young managers (good 
ones) outperform old managers (bad ones) by 9% a year. 
Koh et al. 
(2003) 
Study Asian HFs' performance 
persistence 
Simple factor model: A 
contingency method of winners 
and losers / Then apply a Multi-
factor model 
Strong evidence of persistence at monthly and quarterly 
horizons, with a considerable decrease over a period 
beyond a quarter. 
Asian Hedge and 
Eureka Hedge 417 
Jan. 1999- 
Mar. 2003 
Kat and 
Menexe 
(2002) 
Study the persistence and 
predictability of several 
statistical parameters of 
individual hedge fund returns 
Risk-Return measurement 
analysis (e.g. Mean, SD) and 
Regression Analysis 
Strong persistence in the standard deviation of the hedge 
funds but little evidence of persistence in mean returns. TASS 338 
Jan. 1994- 
May 2001 
Capocci 
(2009) 
Analyze HF performance 
persistency after decomposing 
HF returns 
10-14 Multi-factor models 
including Option factors model 
of Agarwal and Naik (2004) 
Finds a consistent way to create pure alpha using simple 
classification tools: risk-return trade-off measures (the 
Sharpe score), pure volatility measure (the standard 
deviation) and the beta exposure in order to detect 
persistency in the returns. 
MAR/CISDM, 
HFR, TASS, and 
Barclays 
3060 Funds and 903 
Funds of Hedge Funds 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2002 
Abdou and 
Nasereddin 
(2011) 
1- Investigate the persistence 
of some strategies during 
different economic time 
periods 
Divide the sample into three sub-
samples then use the Support 
Vector Mechanism (SVM) 
1- HF strategies are not persistent in the determination of 
returns. Moreover, only the returns of emerging market 
strategy were persistent during the recession. 
CISDM Varies according to each month 
Mar.2000- 
Dec. 2005 
2- Compare different 
mechanisms to test the returns 
prediction accuracy 
Support Vector Mechanism 
(SVM), Neural Network (NN), 
and  Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) 
2- SVM has better prediction accuracy than NN and OLS. 
Tudor and Cao 
(2012) 
Examine the ability of HFs 
and funds of funds to generate 
a consistent absolute return 
over time 
Bayesian multinomial probit and 
regular multinomial logit model 
No evidence for performance persistence in terms of 
absolute return, after accounting for fund strategies and 
fund characteristics. 
CISDM 2460 Funds and 1106 FoHF 
Jan. 1985- 
Apr. 2009 
Cumming et 
al. (2012) 
Test the effect of financial 
regulation on performance 
persistence 
Multivariate tests (Regression 
models) 
Evidence of three types of regulation influencing 
performance persistence: (1) minimum capital 
restrictions, (2) restrictions on the location of key service 
providers, (3) distribution channels. 
CISDM 2073 (3-year alpha) and 4038 (1-year alpha) 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2008 
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Table 7- The main articles on HF managerial characteristics (Career concern and manager’ talents and Managerial timing ability). 
Name Objective Modelling/ Framework Major Findings Database Sample Period 
1-Career concern and managers’ talents 
Boyson (2005) 
Studies the effect of career concerns on 
managerial behaviour and how they might affect 
the performance of HFs 
Regression analysis 
An additional year of experience leads to less risk taking 
behaviour and therefore generating returns around 
0.8%.lower 
TASS 2275 
Jan. 
1994- 
Dec. 
2004 
Agarwal and 
Jorion (2010) 
Analyze the effect of managerial age on the 
performance of emerging hedge funds Regression analysis 
Emerging funds and managers, during their first two 
years of existence, are able to generate an abnormal 
performance of 2.3% relative to that in later years. 
TASS 
Varies 
according to 
each year 
Jan. 
1996- 
Dec. 
2006 
Li et al. (2011) An empirical analysis of the impact of manager characteristics on hedge fund performance Regression analysis 
1- Managers from higher SAT undergraduate 
institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted 
returns, more inflows, and take fewer risks. TASS More than 4000 
1994- 
2003 
2- Some weaker evidence states that more established 
managers tend to have lower returns and take less risk. 
2-Managerial Timing Ability 
Fung et al. 
(2002) 
Examines the market timing ability of global 
equity HFs 
CAPM and  (Henriksson and Merton 
1981) model 
HFs’ managers do not demonstrate any market timing 
ability but do show security-selection ability.  MAR 
115 global 
equity HFs 
1994- 
2000 
Aragon (2003) 
Derives an equilibrium value of market timers’ 
forecasting ability in funds of hedge funds to get 
a steady and reliable estimation of the 
managers’ ability to time multiple markets 
Extending (Merton 1981) model to 
multiple risk factors 
 
 For both individual and aggregate FoHF, managers do 
not have the ability to time the market for different 
investment style. 
 
TASS 299 FoHF 1994- 2002 
Chen (2004) Examine the timing ability of HFs covering various investment categories 
Extends the Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) and Merton (1981) models to 
multiple market frameworks, Then 
proposes the concept of focus 
markets 
Evidence of successful market timing at both the 
individual and style levels. 
TASS and 
HFR 
1471 Funds 
from TASS 
without fund 
of hedge funds 
Jan. 
1994- 
June 
2002 
Cai and Liang 
(2012) 
Examine the existence of timing skills among 
HF managers Dynamic linear regression model 
Find significant timing skills for liquidity timing, 
market timing, and volatility timing. TASS 
3102 (1590 
live, 1512 
defunct) 
Jan. 
1994- 
Dec. 
2008 
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Cao et al. 
(2012) 
1- Investigate managerial ability to time market 
liquidity 
Extend the Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) model 
1- Find strong evidence of liquidity timing ability. 
2- HF managers increase (decrease) their market 
exposure when equity market liquidity is high (low).  
3- Liquidity timing ability of top managers cannot be 
attributed only to luck. TASS 5298 
1994- 
2009 
2- Study the persistency over time of managerial 
timing skill Out of sample test 2- Liquidity timing ability persists over time.  
Chen and Liang 
(2007) 
Examine whether market timing hedge funds 
have the ability to time the US equity market at 
both market level and volatility level 
Based on the classical models of 
(Jensen 1972) and (Admati and 
Bhattacharya 1986) 
Evidence of strong timing ability especially during bear 
markets or when the market is more volatile. 
CISDM, 
TASS, and 
HFR 
221 Market 
Timing Funds 
1994- 
2005 
	
* Notes: TASS:  Lipper TASS, HFR: Hedge fund research, FRM: Financial Risk Management hedge fund database, MAR/Hedge: Managed Accounting Reports (Recently known as Zurich HF Universe), LaPorte 
Asset Allocation system, ZCM: Zurich Capital Markets. 
